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ABSTRACT
The D.C. Circuit’s divided decision in Maloney v. Murphy
granting standing to minority party members of the House
Oversight Committee appears questionable in light of two prior
district court decisions in Waxman and Cummings that had
denied standing in similar circumstances. Most importantly,
Maloney is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent regarding
standing for individual members of Congress. In Raines v. Byrd,
the Supreme Court held that individual members of Congress
generally do not have standing to enforce institutional
congressional interests such as whether a statute is
constitutional, but that one or both Houses of Congress must sue
as an institution. The Maloney decision inappropriately applied
a cognizable personal standing injury theory to the case to
incorrectly find standing when the case should have been
governed by Raines’ institutional injury rule allowing only a
House or Houses of Congress to sue the Executive Branch, and
the court should have denied standing. There are fundamental
separation-of-powers concerns about federal courts intervening
in disputes brought by legislators against the Executive Branch,
and, as a result, courts properly take a narrow view of Article III
standing in such cases. However, a House of Congress could sue
to enforce a subpoena for such information, or an individual
Member of Congress could bring a FOIA request. The Maloney
majority opinion is cleverly argued, but it lacks the nuance and
attention to historical practice in separation-of-powers cases in
District Judge Mehta’s Cummings decision, which Maloney
unfortunately reversed. This article seeks to expose the
weaknesses in the standing theory in the Maloney decision, and,
to prevent a flood of suits by small numbers of congressional
members that could lead to excessive judicial involvement in
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political disputes between the Executive Branch and aggrieved
individual members of Congress. Additionally, even if Maloney
was correctly decided at the time, the Supreme Court’s
subsequent TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez decision, 141 S. Ct.
2190 (2021), raises serious doubts by requiring proof of adverse
effects for informational injuries that the Maloney plaintiffs
might not have been able to prove.
INTRODUCTION
In late 2020, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(“D.C. Circuit”) in a divided two to one opinion in Maloney v. Murphy 2
became the first federal court of appeals to substantively address the
Article III standing of members of Congress pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2954, 3
which was enacted in 1928 and authorizes at least seven members of the
Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives
or five members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs to
require a federal agency to “submit any information requested of it
relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee.” 4 The
Maloney court reversed the decision below by U.S. District Court Judge
Amit P. Mehta, who was appointed by President Obama, 5 in Cummings
v. Murphy.6 The D.C. Circuit’s divided decision granting standing to
minority party members of the House Oversight Committee appears
questionable in light of two prior district court decisions that had denied
standing in similar circumstances.7
Two district court decisions prior to Maloney had concluded that §
2954 does not give members of Congress Article III standing to sue in
2. 984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
3. An Executive agency, on request of the Committee on Government Operations
of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members thereof, or on request
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, or any five members
thereof, shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter
within the jurisdiction of the committee.
29 U.S.C. § 2954.
4. Id.; Maloney, 984 F.3d at 54–56.
5. District Court Judge Amit P. Mehta, U.S. DIST. C T.: DIST. OF D.C.,
https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/content/district-judge-amit-p-mehta (last visited Mar. 3,
2022); President Obama Nominated Allison Dale Burroughs and Amit Priyavadan Mehta
to Serve on the United States District Courts, DON411.COM (July 31, 2014),
https://don411.com/president-obama-nominated-allison-dale-burroughs-and-amitpriyavadan-mehta-to-serve-on-the-united-states-district-courts/.
6. 321 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d sub nom. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50
(D.C. Cir. 2020).
7. See infra Part IV.
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light of applicable Supreme Court precedent regarding legislative
standing.8 First, the Cummings decision had denied Article III standing
to Representative Elijah Cummings and seven other members of the
House Oversight Committee because (1) applicable Supreme Court
precedent suggested that the plaintiffs had an unenforceable
institutional injury that only a House of Congress could enforce rather
than an appropriate personal standing injury, (2) the failure of the
plaintiffs to obtain approval from the entire House of Representatives,
and (3) the availability of alternative remedies such as the entire House
approving the enforcement of a subpoena. 9 The District Court in
Cummings had relied on a prior decision by U.S. District Court Judge
Margaret M. Morrow, who was appointed by President Clinton, 10 in
Waxman v. Thompson,11 which held that eighteen members of the United
States House of Representatives who served on the House Committee on
Government Reform did not have Article III standing under § 2954
because individual members of Congress generally do not have standing
under applicable Supreme Court precedent to sue to enforce official
congressional interests, but only a House of Congress or both Houses of
Congress may enforce an institutional interest such as issuing a
subpoena to obtain documents.12 In light of the Cummings and Waxman
decisions, the Maloney decision appears to be questionable.13
Most importantly, Maloney is inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent regarding standing for individual members of Congress.14 In
Raines v. Byrd,15 the Supreme Court held that individual members of
Congress generally do not have standing to enforce institutional
congressional interests such as whether a statute is constitutional, but
that one or both Houses of Congress must sue as an institution. 16 By

8. Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 113; Waxman v. Thompson, No. 04-3467, 2006 WL
8432224, at *6–12 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006).
9. Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 113–18.
10. Morrow, Margaret M., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/morrowmargaret-m (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
11. Waxman, 2006 WL 8432224, at *1.
12. Id. at *6–12.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997).
15. Id..
16. Id. at 829–30. Two recent D.C. Circuit cases have held that one House of Congress
sometimes has standing to sue the Executive Branch, but the courts also noted that some
types of congressional suits require both Houses of Congress. U.S. House of Representatives
v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“When the injury alleged is to the Congress as
a whole, one chamber does not have standing to litigate. When the injury is to the distinct
prerogatives of a single chamber, that chamber does have standing to assert the injury.”);
Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 778
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contrast, in Powell v. McCormack,17 the Court held that a member of
Congress had a personal injury and had standing to sue about being
denied his seat in Congress and a resulting loss of salary. 18 In Maloney,
the majority analogized the denial of information to the congressional
plaintiffs as similar to Powell and therefore found a cognizable personal
standing injury,19 but Judge Ginsburg in dissent argued that the case
involved an institutional interest like Raines and was not similar to the
personal injury in Powell.20
Neither Raines nor Powell addressed informational injuries.21
Accordingly, Judge Millett’s determination in Maloney that
informational injuries to members of Congress are more like the personal
injuries in Powell is not clearly contrary to Raines.22 Judge Mehta in
Cummings acknowledged that the informational injuries to members of
the House Committee on Government Reform were more personal and
particularized than those raised by the congressional plaintiffs over the
enactment of legislation in Raines.23 But he reasoned that the plaintiff
members of Congress were fundamentally asserting an institutional
injury as in Raines because their need for such information depended
upon their status as members of Congress and the House Oversight
Committee and not upon personal needs such as receiving their
congressional salary, like in Powell.24 Finally, Judge Mehta provided
examples of a historical practice of resolving informational disputes
between Congress and the Executive Branch by having an entire House
of Congress issue a subpoena to obtain requested information rather than
having members of Congress filing suit in federal court. 25 The line
between personal injuries and institutional injuries is not always clear
for members of Congress, but Judge Mehta’s analysis of the facts was
more nuanced, and his adherence to Supreme Court precedent was more
faithful, than the Maloney decision even if the latter decision was not
obviously wrong.26

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (holding that the House of Representatives has standing to
enforce a subpoena not involving the joinder of the Senate).
17. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
18. Id. at 512–14.
19. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 65–66 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
20. See id. at 70–76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21. See infra Part III.A.2.
22. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62–70.
23. See Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 112–13 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d sub nom.
Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
24. See id. at 108–13.
25. Id. at 113–17.
26. See infra Parts IV, Conclusion.
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The facts of Maloney involve then-President Donald Trump’s lease of
the Old Post Office in Washington, D.C. for a hotel and a congressional
request by eight Members of Congress for information about that lease
from the U.S. General Services Administration (“GSA”).27 As a matter of
policy, the Trump administration should have released the information
to the congressional plaintiffs, and the Trump White House did not try to
defend the GSA’s failure to do so.28 But the specific facts involving former
President Trump should not cloud the legal issue of whether § 2954 gives
seven or more members of the U.S. House or five members of Senate
Committees on Oversight and Reform Article III standing in federal
courts to sue if a federal agency refuses a request for information from
these members of Congress.29 Both the district court judges in the
Cummings and Waxman decisions, Judges Mehta and Morrow
respectively, were appointed by Democratic presidents, but each
appropriately ruled against Democratic members of Congress in their
cases and in favor of Republican presidents because of separation-ofpowers concerns.30 Judges Mehta and Morrow each concluded that seven
members of the House or five members of the Senate may not sue under
§ 2954 in light of the Raines decision, but that only the entire House may
sue to enforce a subpoena, or else individual members of Congress may
seek information like any citizen under one of several statutes. 31 This
article seeks to expose the weaknesses in the standing theory in the
Maloney decision and to prevent a flood of suits by small numbers of
congressional members that could lead to excessive judicial involvement
in political disputes between the Executive Branch and aggrieved
individual members of Congress.
Additionally, even if Maloney was correctly decided at the time, the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez32
raises serious doubts by requiring proof of “adverse effects” for
informational injuries that the Maloney plaintiffs might not have been
able to prove as private individuals.33 Justice Kavanaugh’s majority
opinion in TransUnion suggested that the Court might apply a less strict
proof of harm standard to “cases involv[ing] denial of information subject
to public-disclosure or sunshine laws that entitle all members of the
27. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 56–57.
28. See infra Conclusion.
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 2954; infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
33. See id. at 2214 (quoting Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 1004
(11th Cir. 2020)) (“An ‘asserted informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot
satisfy Article III.’”).
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public to certain information.” 34 However, § 2954, like the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”)35 statute at issue in TransUnion, is not “such a
public-disclosure law” because only members of Congress, and not the
public at large, may sue pursuant to § 2954.36
Part I will briefly explain the fundamentals of Article III standing. 37
Part II will explain the basics of informational injury as a prelude to
understanding the interactions of informational standing and
congressional standing in Part IV.38 Part III will address cases limiting
the standing of individual members of Congress to either a House of
Congress or the entire Congress as an institution.39 Part IV will show
that the district court decisions in Cummings and Waxman were correct
to hold that several members of Congress do not have Article III standing
under § 2954 to sue a federal agency that denies standing under that
statute, and, accordingly, that the majority opinion in Maloney was
wrongly decided.40 This article will conclude that suits under § 2954 are
not essential to congressional oversight of the Executive Branch because
a House of Congress may issue a subpoena for such information41 or an
individual member could file a request under the Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”)42 if members of the House or Senate Oversight Committees
cannot sue under § 2954. 43

34. Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
36. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214. Compare id. (“Akins and Public Citizen do not
control here [because] . . . those cases involved denial of information subject to publicdisclosure or sunshine laws that entitle all members of the public to certain information.”),
with 29 U.S.C. § 2954 (establishing right to information from Executive only for
congressional members of certain oversight committees).
37. See infra Part I.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d
755, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (holding House of Representatives has standing to
enforce a subpoena not involving the joinder of the Senate).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
43. Compare Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62 (government acknowledged right of individual
members of Congress to obtain information under FOIA), with id. at 75 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing subpoena authority of a House of Congress).
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I. ARTICLE III CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING44

The U.S. Constitution vests limited powers in each of the three
branches of the federal government.45 The Constitution provides that
Congress has enumerated “legislative Powers,”46 the President possesses
“[t]he executive Power,”47 and the federal courts exercise “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States.”48 The Article III standing doctrine places
limits on the types of cases that federal courts may hear based upon these
separation-of-powers principles, and serves to prevent the Judicial
Branch from usurping the authority of the other two branches, the
Executive and Legislative, which are often referred to as the political
branches.49
While the Constitution does not explicitly require that plaintiffs have
Article III standing to file suit in federal courts, the Supreme Court has
implied limitations on the authority of federal judges to hear suits, based
on the Constitution’s Article III restriction of judicial decisions to “Cases”
and “Controversies,” to ensure that a plaintiff has a genuine interest and
stake in a case and to prevent judicial intrusion on the authority of the
political branches.50 A plaintiff has the burden of establishing that their
44. The discussion of standing in Parts I, II and III relies upon my earlier standing
articles: (1) Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1; (2) Standing over
Appropriations?, supra note 1; and (3) Informational Standing, supra note 1.
45. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337 (2016).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
49. See Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 337; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341
(2006); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; – to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; – to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; – to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; – to Controversies
between two or more States; – [between a State and Citizens of another State; –]
. . . between Citizens of different States, – between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, [and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, – and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.]
Id. at cl. 1; Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 337–38; Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408
(2013); DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 339–41 (explaining why Supreme Court infers that
case and controversy requirement under Article III necessitates standing limitations);
Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1380; see generally Michael E. Solimine,
Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1023, 1036–38
(2009) (discussing debate over whether the Constitution implicitly requires standing to
sue).
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suit is an appropriate “[c]ase” or “[c]ontroversy” that a federal court may
hear.51
The Supreme Court has defined a three-part Article III standing test
that requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) a concrete and particularized
injury; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant; and (3) that it must be likely that the injury can be
redressed by a favorable federal court decision. 52 A plaintiff has the
burden of establishing all three parts of the standing test for each form
of judicial remedy or relief sought.53 A federal court must dismiss a case
without deciding the merits of the case if the plaintiff fails to meet the
constitutional Article III standing test.54
II. INFORMATIONAL STANDING
The majority opinion in Maloney concluded that the “agency’s failure
to provide information to which the Requesters are statutorily entitled is
a quintessential form of concrete and particularized injury within the
meaning of Article III.”55 The court then explained that the “Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that informational injuries satisfy the injuryin-fact requirement.”56 Accordingly, the Maloney majority opinion held
that the congressional requestors had suffered a personal informational
injury akin to the personal injury in Powell, in which the Supreme Court
had granted a member of Congress Article III standing to sue.57 The U.S.
government on behalf of the GSA acknowledged that a federal agency’s
denial of information that a plaintiff is entitled to under a statute such
as FOIA generally creates an informational injury that establishes an
injury sufficient for Article III standing.58 However, the GSA argued that,
in light of the Raines decision, a federal agency’s refusal to give
legislators information pursuant to § 2954 does not create an
informational injury or Article III standing because a statute may not

51. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408 (2013); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
52. Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2019); Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 9.
53. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–52; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately
for each form of relief sought.”); Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1381.
54. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–43; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180
(“[W]e have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at
the outset of the litigation.”); Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1381.
55. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 62–70.
58. Id. at 62.
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give individual legislators special rights to information, only a House of
Congress or the entire Congress as an institution.59
Even though the government conceded in the Maloney case that
individual members of Congress suffer a cognizable informational injury
if a federal agency denies them information pursuant to a statute such
as FOIA,60 it will be helpful to review Supreme Court decisions
establishing that informational injuries may create Article III standing
in some circumstances.61 For example, in his dissenting opinion in
Maloney, Judge Ginsburg acknowledged that the plaintiff members of
Congress had suffered a concrete harm when the GSA denied them
requested information about the Trump hotel project. 62 However, Judge
Ginsburg argued that their injury was not “particularized” as required
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins63 because they
had not suffered a personal injury, but only the House as an institution. 64
Accordingly, it is important to understand when informational injuries
are concrete and particularized.65
A. Public Citizen and Akins
1. Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of
Justice 66 held that the government’s denial of information that the public
is entitled to by statute may constitute a sufficient injury for Article III
standing.67 Agreeing with decisions that have recognized informational
standing under the Freedom of Information Act, the Court determined
that the plaintiffs had standing to seek information pursuant to the
Federal Advisory Committee Act’s (“FACA”)68 statutory mandates.69
Additionally, the Court rejected the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”)
argument that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they alleged

59. Id. at 62–63; see also id. at 70–76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 62 (majority opinion).
61. See infra Part II.A–C.
62. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 71.
64. See id. at 71–76.
65. See infra Part II.B.
66. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
67. Id. at 449–50; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1383;
Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 15–16. Justice Scalia took no part in the Court’s
consideration of the case or its decision. See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 442.
68. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1.
69. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at
1383; Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 16.
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a generalized grievance shared by many other citizens, observing that
“the fact that numerous citizens might request the same information
under the Freedom of Information Act” does not deprive a plaintiff of an
informational injury and Article III standing.70
2. Akins
In 1998, the Supreme Court in FEC v. Akins 71 held that
informational injuries resulting from the government’s denial of
information to plaintiffs that a statute requires to be made available to
the public at large are possibly sufficient for Article III standing.72 The
Akins Court addressed whether plaintiff voters had standing to challenge
a Federal Election Commission decision that a lobbying group, the
American Israeli Political Action Committee (“AIPAC”), was not a
“political committee” within the definition of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”),73 and, therefore, was not required to
disclose its donors, contributions, or expenditures pursuant to that
statute.74 FECA “imposes extensive recordkeeping and disclosure
requirements upon groups that fall within the Act’s definition of a
‘political committee.’”75
The Akins Court held that the plaintiff voters had suffered a
“concrete and particular” injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing
because they were deprived of their statutory right to receive designated
“information [which] would help them . . . to evaluate candidates for
public office,” even though many other voters shared the same
informational injury as the plaintiffs.76 The decision determined that the
government’s denial of information to the plaintiff voters for which the
Act required public disclosure was a constitutionally sufficient “genuine
‘injury in fact.’”77 The Court clarified, “The “‘injury in fact’ that
respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain

70. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note
1, at 1384; Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 16.
71. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
72. Id. at 21–25; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1384;
Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 17–20.
73. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 (FECA has been recodified as 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–26).
74. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13–18; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1384;
Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 17–18.
75. Akins, 524 U.S. at 14–15 (summarizing 2 U.S.C. §§ 432–34).
76. Id. at 21–25; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1385;
Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 17–20.
77. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1385;
Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 18.
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information . . . the statute requires that AIPAC make [such
information] public.”78
Additionally, Akins specifically concluded that the deprivation of
information that the plaintiffs could use “to evaluate candidates for
public office” constituted a “concrete and particular” injury. 79 The Court
found that the fact that “an injury [that] is widely shared . . . does not, by
itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such
an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an ‘injury in fact.’” 80
Thus, the Akins decision elucidated that courts should not deny standing
solely because large numbers of persons have the same or similar
injuries, so long as those injuries are concrete.81 Moreover, the Akins
decision emphasized that courts should give important weight to
Congress’ intent with respect to statutory rights definitions when
determining whether a statutory injury is concrete or abstract.82 By
contrast, Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion contending that the
voter plaintiffs did not have standing because their injury was common
to the public at large and, accordingly, they did not have a particularized
injury essential for standing.83 The majority opinion in Maloney
interpreted Public Citizen and Akins as clearly supporting the plaintiffs’
argument that a federal agency’s denial of information to members of
Congress pursuant to § 2954 constitutes a concrete and particularized
injury sufficient for Article III standing.84
B. Spokeo Reaffirms Informational Standing
In 2016, the Supreme Court in Spokeo addressed what constitutes
sufficient informational injury for Article III standing. 85 The Spokeo
Court held that a plaintiff alleging an injury in violation of a federal
statute must show not only a concrete injury, but also a particularized
one to satisfy the standing requirement of an injury-in-fact.86 By

78. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21.
79. Id.; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1385; Informational
Standing, supra note 1, at 18.
80. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added); Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra
note 1, at 1385; Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 19.
81. Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1386; Informational Standing,
supra note 1, at 19–20.
82. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1386;
Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 19–20.
83. Akins, 524 U.S. at 33–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Informational Standing in Spokeo,
supra note 1, at 1385; Informational Standing, supra note 1, at 21.
84. See United States v. Maloney, 984 F.3d 50, 59–61 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
85. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338–42 (2016).
86. Id. at 334, 339–40, 342–43.
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contrast, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion would have treated the
terms “concrete” and “particularized” as synonymous and not requiring
separate tests.87 An important question is whether the Spokeo Court’s
distinction between concrete and particularized injuries supports Senior
Circuit Judge Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Maloney, which argued
that the plaintiff members of Congress had suffered a concrete harm, but
not a particularized injury, when the GSA denied them requested
information under § 2954 because their injury was an institutional
injury, one to their oversight duties, rather than a personal injury.88
The Supreme Court in Spokeo agreed with and quoted the definition
of a particularized standing injury from its 1992 decision in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife: “[f]or an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’”89 In Spokeo, the plaintiff
had clearly suffered from a personal and therefore particularized injury,
but the question was whether the alleged injury was a concrete injury or
a mere abstract injury.90 The Supreme Court in Spokeo agreed with the
Ninth Circuit’s decision that the plaintiff, Robins, had alleged an injury
to his personal interests given how the defendant Spokeo, Inc. had
mishandled his personal credit information and, therefore, that the
plaintiff had properly alleged a particularized standing injury. 91
However, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth
Circuit because the court of appeals had only found that Robins had
suffered from an individualized or particularized injury, and had failed
to consider whether the plaintiff also had a concrete injury. 92
The Spokeo decision explained that “[a] ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de
facto’; that is, it must actually exist.”93 The Court further explicated,
“[w]hen we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey
the usual meaning of the term—‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”94 Thus, the
Spokeo Court articulated that “[c]oncreteness, therefore, is quite
different from particularization.”95 Additionally, the Court clarified that
the “risk of real harm” can satisfy the concreteness standing test, and, as
an example, observed that tort victims may recover “even if their harms

87. See id. at 351–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 71–76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (affirmatively quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 n.1 (1992)).
90. Id. at 333–37, 339–40.
91. Id. at 333–41; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1388.
92. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 334, 343; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at
1388.
93. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1388.
94. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1388.
95. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1388.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

734

WINTER 2022

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:721

may be difficult to prove or measure.”96 However, Justice Alito’s majority
opinion further elucidated the standing test by observing that a reporting
inaccuracy that does not constitute a “material risk of harm” and, like an
“incorrect zip code,” is not a concrete injury.97
Significantly, the Spokeo Court considered the government’s
violation of a statute granting public access to government-held
information to be a concrete injury that may in some cases allow a
plaintiff to establish Article III standing without proof of additional
harm.98 The Spokeo Court declared, “[j]ust as the common law permitted
suit in such instances, the violation of a procedural right granted by
statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in
fact. In other words, a plaintiff . . . need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified.”99 Justice Alito’s majority
opinion then relied upon Akins and Public Citizen to support the Court’s
finding that a plaintiff in some circumstances may suffer a concrete
injury from the violation of a procedural right without proving additional
harm.100 As this author clarified, “Congress has a significant role in
defining intangible injuries for Article III standing beyond what was
considered an injury under the American or English common law.”101
However, whether Congress can define injuries under § 2954 for
members of Congress raises separation-of-powers issues that are
different from the intangible injuries discussed in the Spokeo decision.102
As will be discussed in Part IV, the majority opinion in Maloney
interpreted the Spokeo decision as supporting its determination that the
congressional plaintiffs had suffered from both a concrete injury and a
personal, particularized injury.103 By contrast, Judge Ginsburg in his
dissenting opinion in Maloney argued that the plaintiffs had suffered a
concrete injury from the denial of information, but that the injury was
not personal or particularized because it was an institutionalized injury
to the entire House.104 The issue of whether the injury to the
congressional plaintiffs in Maloney was personal and particularized, or
96. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1388.
97. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1388.
98. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341–42 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998); Public
Citizen v. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)); Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra
note 1, at 1388.
99. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342; Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1388.
100. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25; Public Citizen, 491 U.S.
at 449); Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1388–89.
101. Informational Standing in Spokeo, supra note 1, at 1389; see also Spokeo, 578 U.S.
at 340–42.
102. See infra Part IV.
103. See United States v. Maloney, 984 F.3d 50, 50, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2020); infra Part IV.
104. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 50, 71–76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); infra Part IV.
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institutional and not particularized, depends on the Supreme Court’s
congressional standing cases, which are discussed in Part III. 105
C. TransUnion LLC Requires Proof of Adverse Effects for Informational
Injuries
About six months after the D.C. Circuit decided Maloney in December
2020,106 the Supreme Court in June 2021 decided TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez107 in a divided five to four decision.108 The TransUnion case did
not overrule the Spokeo decision, but it arguably narrowed or limited the
Court’s approach to informational standing in the view of the four
dissenting justices: Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan. 109
The Supreme Court’s TransUnion decision does not clearly contradict the
Maloney decision, but Judge Millett’s broad approach to informational
standing is much more similar to the dissenting opinions in TransUnion
than Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion and, therefore, it is
reasonable to question Maloney’s value as precedent in light of
TransUnion.110
In TransUnion, the defendant TransUnion’s credit reporting service
had falsely identified 8,185 individuals as potentially being on the U.S.
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) list of
terrorists, drug traffickers, and other serious criminals.111 The 8,185
individuals brought a class action suit112 pursuant to The Fair Credit
Reporting Act,113 which regulates the consumer reporting agencies that
compile and disseminate personal information about consumers, and
authorizes lawsuits and damages for certain violations of the Act. 114 The
parties stipulated prior to trial that only 1,853 class members had their
misleading credit reports containing OFAC alerts provided to third
parties during the relevant time period in the suit and that the credit
files of the other 6,332 class members were not provided to third parties
during the relevant time period.115 The district court ruled that all class

105. See infra Part III.
106. See generally Maloney, 984 F.3d 50.
107. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
108. See generally id.
109. Id. at 2214–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joined by Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.);
id. at 2225–26 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (joined by Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.).
110. See infra Parts II.C, IV.C.
111. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200–02, 2207–09.
112. Id.
113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a–1681x.
114. Id. §§ 1681, 1681a–1681x.
115. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2208–09.
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members had Article III standing for their statutory claims.116 The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and awarded each class member
statutory damages and punitive damages.117 A divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit affirmed that all 8,185 class members had standing as to all three
claims, but somewhat reduced the damages awarded by the jury and
approved a class damages award of about $40 million.118
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision by holding that those 6,332 class members whose false
information was not reported to third parties “have not demonstrated
concrete [reputational] harm and thus lack Article III standing to sue on
the reasonable-procedures claim.”119 The Court had “no trouble
concluding that the 1,853 class members suffered a concrete harm that
qualifies as an injury in fact” because they suffered informational harm
akin to the tort of defamation by being labeled as terrorists or criminals
to third parties.120 Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion read the Spokeo
decision as requiring a plaintiff to suffer from a concrete injury in order
to have Article III standing.121 The 6,332 class members whose false
information was not reported to third parties did not suffer a concrete
injury necessary for Article III standing even if TransUnion LLC’s
handling of their information was poor and exposed them to significant
risk because they did not suffer an actual material injury.122 By contrast,
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in TransUnion argued that the
6,332 class members had suffered from a concrete injury because the
Spokeo decision counseled federal courts to defer to the definition of
injury established by Congress in the relevant statute, the FCRA in this
case, rather than the Court’s common law assessment of what is
actionable defamation.123
In TransUnion, the United States acting as amicus curiae
“separately assert[ed] that the plaintiffs suffered a concrete

116. Id. at 2213 n.8.
117. Id. at 2202.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2200.
120. Id. at 2209.
121. Id. at 2210–14.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2214–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Blocks
Congress on the Right to Sue, BLOOMBERG L. (June 25, 2021, 12:43 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-25/supreme-court-liberal-justicesjoin-clarence-thomas-on-lawsuit-ruling-dissent (arguing that TransUnion gave the
Supreme Court, and not Congress, authority to decide what is a proper Article III standing
injury, and thereby limited the authority of “Congress to confer rights on individuals by law
and then give them the authority to sue in federal court to enforce those rights.”).
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‘informational injury’” under Akins and Public Citizen.124 The Court
rejected the government’s informational injury argument because the
TransUnion plaintiffs had received the information they requested, as
Akins and Public Citizen requires, but the TransUnion plaintiffs’
compliant instead made a different argument that the information was
false or in a different format than requested.125 The United States’
argument that the TransUnion plaintiffs suffered from a concrete
“informational injury” under Akins and Public Citizen is relevant to the
continuing validity of Maloney because Judge Millett relied heavily on
the Akins and Public Citizen cases in deciding that the congressional
plaintiffs in her case had Article III standing. 126 The Maloney plaintiffs
arguably had a stronger “informational injury” argument than the
TransUnion plaintiffs because the congressional plaintiffs did not receive
the information they had requested from the GSA.127
However, the TransUnion decision contains additional language
about plaintiffs proving adverse harms to establish Article III standing
that could undermine future congressional plaintiffs that sue pursuant
to § 2954. Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion stated that the Akins
and Public Citizen cases “involved denial of information subject to publicdisclosure or sunshine laws that entitle all members of the public to
certain information. This case does not involve such a public-disclosure
law.”128 This language in the TransUnion decision could hurt future
congressional plaintiffs suing under § 2954 because that statute is not a
public disclosure statute and, therefore, Judge Millett in Maloney was
arguably wrong to rely on the Akins and Public Citizen cases in finding
that the plaintiffs in her case had standing. 129 The TransUnion decision
requires plaintiffs to identify ‘“downstream consequences’ from failing to
receive the required information” and to demonstrate “adverse effects” to
satisfy Article III.130 The problem for the congressional plaintiffs in
Maloney and future congressional plaintiffs suing pursuant to § 2954 is
that it would be easy for such plaintiffs to prove that the denial of
124. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214.
125. Id.
126. See infra Part IV.C.
127. See infra Part IV.C.
128. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214.
129. See infra Part IV.C (explaining Judge Millett’s decision in Maloney). Compare
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214 (explaining that “Akins and Public Citizen do not control
here” because “those cases involved denial of information subject to public-disclosure or
sunshine laws that entitle all members of the public to certain information”), with 29 U.S.C.
§ 2954 (establishing right to information from Executive only for congressional members of
certain oversight committees).
130. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964
F.3d 990, 1004 (11th Cir. 2020)).
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information from the Executive Branch harms their institutional
congressional work, but Raines and Powell instead require individual
Members of Congress to prove a personal injury because only a House or
two Houses of Congress can assert institutional injuries. 131 It is far from
clear that the Executive’s denial of information to Members of Congress
has the “downstream consequences” and “adverse effects” to their
personal lives that the TransUnion decision requires for informational
injuries.132
III. LEGISLATIVE STANDING
In suits involving individual members of Congress, a crucial issue in
determining Article III standing is whether that member is suing to
protect a personal interest or an institutional interest, either of a House
of Congress or Congress as a whole.133 Under Supreme Court precedent
regarding congressional or legislative Article III standing, especially the
Raines decision, individual members of Congress generally do not have
standing when they are suing to defend the Legislative Branch’s
institutional powers; only Congress as a whole or a House of Congress
has a plausible argument for institutional standing.134 On the other

131. See infra Parts III, IV.
132. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214.
133. See infra Part III.
134. See infra Part III; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). Several authors have argued
in favor of congressional standing in different circumstances, although a few scholars
generally disagree with congressional suits in federal courts and prefer that disputes
between Congress and the Executive Branch be addressed through the political process
alone. See Matthew I. Hall, Making Sense of Legislative Standing, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 44
(2016) (“Only the elimination of a concrete prerogative belonging to a legislative litigant
provides a sufficient injury to support legislative standing for that litigant.”); McKaye
Neumeister, Reviving the Power of the Purse: Appropriations Clause Litigation and
National Security Law, 127 YALE L.J. 2512, 2571 (2018) (supporting congressional standing
to challenge spending without appropriations); Standing over Appropriations?, supra note
1, at 141, 144, 147–52 (favoring congressional standing to challenge spending without
appropriations); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing,
114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 339 (2015) (arguing congressional standing should depend on the
extent that a particular executive action undermines legislative bargaining power). But see
Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA.
L. REV. 611, 663 (2019) (criticizing congressional standing because “[i]nstitutions have no
greater interest in their constitutional powers and duties than any other member of
society”); Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and Congress
in U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 93 IND. L.J. 845, 893 (2018) (“[I]t is the better part of
wisdom for courts to presume the good faith of other branches and to continue to structure
standing law on the assumption that most controversies between the branches are best
addressed through political mechanisms.”).
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hand, in Powell v. McCormack,135 the Court concluded that a member of
Congress had a personal Article III standing injury and could sue the
House of Representatives after the House voted to deny his seat in
Congress and his salary.136 In Maloney, the central issue dividing the
majority opinion and Judge Ginsburg’s dissent was whether the GSA’s
denial of information to several Members of the House, who had
requested such information under § 2954, constituted a personal injury,
which the majority opinion held, or an institutional injury, which Judge
Ginsburg argued in the dissent.137 Accordingly, it is important to
understand how courts have distinguished between institutional
congressional suits and personal suits by members of Congress.138
A. Early Legislative Standing Cases: Coleman and Raines
1. Coleman v. Miller
In Coleman v. Miller,139 the Supreme Court held that twenty Kansas
state senators could seek a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of
the Senate of the State of Kansas to contest whether the Kansas State
Senate actually ratified the Child Labor Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.140 Subsequent decisions, including Raines, have generally
interpreted Coleman as an exceptional case in which individual members
of a legislature may challenge an institutional decision of the legislature
if other government actors have completely nullified their vote and there
is no political recourse other than a lawsuit to rectify that nullification. 141
However, in the Maloney litigation, the congressional plaintiffs cited
Coleman as supporting their claim that they had suffered a personal
injury when the GSA denied their request for records pursuant to
§ 2954.142 The district court in Cummings and Judge Ginsburg’s
135. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
136. Id. at 512–14.
137. See infra Part IV.C; see also infra Part IV.D. Compare Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d
50, 59–70 (D.C. Cir. 2020), with id. at 70–76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138. See infra Part III.
139. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
140. Id. at 456; see also id. at 438–46 (concluding that twenty Kansas state senators had
a right to standing to have their vote counted and that the state court decision below
nullified that right); Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 148–49.
141. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 72 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also
Waxman v. Thompson, No. 04-3467, 2006 WL 8432224, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006)
(discussing cases that describe Coleman as a narrow exception by which individual
members of a legislature may challenge an institutional decision); infra Part III.A.2
(discussing Raines’ narrow interpretation of Coleman).
142. Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 108–09 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d sub nom.
Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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dissenting opinion in Maloney rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that
Coleman supported their claim of a standing injury,143 but the Maloney
majority cited Coleman with a “cf” citation, suggesting that the case
mildly supported the plaintiffs’ standing claims because “although
asserting an institutional injury, [the Coleman] legislators had standing
because their individual ‘votes * * * ha[d] been overridden and virtually
held for naught.’” 144
In Coleman, there had been a tie vote of twenty to twenty in the
Kansas Senate for the proposed constitutional amendment, and the
Lieutenant Governor, the presiding officer of the Kansas Senate, had
broken the tie by voting in favor of the amendment.145 The twenty Kansas
state senators who voted against the proposed amendment contended
that amendments to the U.S. Constitution must be passed by state
legislators only, and that state executive officials should not vote on
proposed amendments even to resolve a tied legislative vote.146 The
Supreme Court of Kansas denied mandamus because the court
determined on the merits that the amendment was validly enacted
because the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas may cast the deciding vote
on proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution if there is a tie
legislative vote in the Kansas Senate.147
After granting certiorari to review the decision of the Supreme Court
of Kansas, the U.S. Supreme Court in Coleman, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, determined that the twenty Kansas state
senators had standing to sue because they had an interest in the
“effectiveness of their votes” and whether their votes were “given effect”
in a context in which their votes would have changed the result of the
vote on the constitutional amendment, and, therefore, their votes had
been effectively nullified.148 Justice Hughes concluded:
143. See Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d. at 109–10; see also Maloney, 984 F.3d at 72 n.3
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. Maloney, 984 F.3d at 63 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)).
145. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436–38 (determining that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
because twenty state senators had standing to have their votes effectively counted);
Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 148.
146. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436. The Kansas House of Representatives subsequently
voted to ratify the amendment and, therefore, the State of Kansas would have voted in favor
of the proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution if the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas
could cast a deciding vote in the Kansas Senate in the event of a tied legislative vote. See
id.; Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 148.
147. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 437; Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 148–49.
148. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (“We find the cases cited in support of the contention, that
petitioners lack an adequate interest to invoke our jurisdiction to review, to be inapplicable.
Here, the plaintiffs include twenty senators, whose votes against ratification have been
overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their
votes would have been sufficient to defeat ratification. We think that these senators have a
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[W]e find no departure from principle in recognizing in the
instant case that at least the twenty senators whose votes, if their
contention were sustained, would have been sufficient to defeat
the resolution ratifying the proposed constitutional amendment,
have an interest in the controversy which, treated by the state
court as a basis for entertaining and deciding the federal
questions, is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to review
that decision.149
Significantly, the Raines decision, discussed below, suggested that
the Coleman decision’s recognition of standing for individual Kansas
state senators was limited to a situation where the legislative plaintiffs
were not challenging the Executive’s implementation or interpretation of
a statute, but rather whether the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas had
interfered with the legislative process of the Kansas Senate to nullify
their votes as a legislative body.150
2. Raines v. Byrd
In Raines v. Byrd,151 the Supreme Court held that individual
members of Congress usually do not have Article III standing to
challenge institutional decisions of Congress such as the enactment of an
allegedly unconstitutional statute.152 The inability of individual members
of Congress to challenge institutional legislative actions applied in
Raines even though Congress in a statute attempted to grant standing to
plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.
Petitioners come directly within the provisions of the statute governing our appellate
jurisdiction. They have set up and claimed a right and privilege under the Constitution of
the United States to have their votes given effect and the state court has denied that right
and privilege.”); Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 149.
149. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446.
150. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–25 (1997); see also Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F.
Supp. 3d 92, 110 (D.D.C. 2018) (interpreting the Coleman and Raines decisions as limiting
individual legislative standing to challenge institutional legislative action to circumstances
like those in Coleman where there is complete vote nullification), rev’d sub nom. Maloney
v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2020); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130
F. Supp. 3d 53, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2015) (interpreting the Coleman and Raines decisions as
above); Waxman v. Thompson, No. 04-3467, 2006 WL 8432224, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 24,
2006) (interpreting the Coleman and Raines decisions as above); Standing over
Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 149–50 (interpreting the Coleman and Raines decisions
as above).
151. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
152. Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 149–50 (summarizing the
differentiation between the institutional injuries to Congress that do not give rise to
standing by individual members of Congress and personal injuries to a legislator that may
establish standing).
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individual legislators to challenge the particular statute at issue in the
case.153 Rather, an individual legislator only has Article III standing if
they can show they have suffered a “personal concrete injury” from a
legislative action like any member of the public.154
In Raines, Senator Robert Byrd and several other members of
Congress alleged that the Line Item Veto Act155 “damaged the institution
of Congress by unconstitutionally expanding the president’s veto
authority.”156 However, the Court rejected standing for their institutional
claims because individual members of Congress may not sue based on
“possible generalized harm to the legislature” as an institution when they
failed to prove that “their claimed injury is personal, particularized,
concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable.”157 On the other hand, the
Raines decision recognized that the Court in Powell had held that a
member of Congress might be able to sue to defend his personal injury
upon being denied his seat in Congress and congressional pay.158
Additionally, the Court observed that “[w]e attach some importance to
the fact that appellees have not been authorized to represent their
respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed both Houses
actively oppose their suit.”159
The Court in Raines distinguished its decision in Coleman as an
exceptional case in which individual legislators may challenge an
institutional decision of a legislature in the rare circumstances where the
individual legislators are arguably completely denied the right to cast an

153. Raines, 521 U.S. at 815–16; see also Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1,
at 149. The Line Item Veto Act provided that any member of Congress could assert a
constitutional violation and sue for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the statute.
See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104–30, § 3(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1200, 1211 (1996).
154. Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 149–50; Raines, 521 U.S. at
820–21, 829–30 (explaining that individual members of Congress usually only have
standing for personal injuries to a legislator).
155. See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104–30, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
156. Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 149; Raines, 521 U.S. at 814–17.
157. Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 149–50 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S.
at 820); see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 821, 830 (explaining that standing was inappropriate
since the claim was not for a private personal injury to a member of Congress).
158. Raines, 521 U.S. at 820–21 (noting that the court in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 496, 512–14 (1969), concluded that a member of Congress has standing to sue to
challenge his disbarring from the House of Representatives and his loss of his legislative
salary); Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 150 n.46.
159. Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 150 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at
829). The court in Raines reasoned that individual members of Congress do not have
standing when a House of Congress has not voted to support their suit and appellees have
not alleged any injury to personal interests. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.
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effective vote on a matter.160 After discussing the facts and issues in
Coleman, the Raines decision observed:
It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman stands . . . for the
proposition that legislators whose votes would have been
sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have
standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does
not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been
completely nullified.161
The Raines decision distinguished the result in Coleman by clarifying
that the facts in its own case involved merely a possible dilution of
legislative authority, but Coleman involved the distinct and more
fundamental question of whether a purported legislative action created
a valid legal act: “There is a vast difference between the level of vote
nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional
legislative power that is alleged here. To uphold standing here would
require a drastic extension of Coleman. We are unwilling to take that
step.”162 Furthermore, the Raines decision differentiated between the
facts in its own case from those in Coleman by observing that “the
institutional injury [the plaintiffs in Raines] allege is wholly abstract and
widely dispersed (contra Coleman).”163 Additionally, “the Raines decision
justified the denial of standing for members of Congress on the grounds
that Congress could simply repeal the disputed statute or exempt
appropriations bills from its application” and individuals injured by the
statute could raise constitutional challenges to it.164
The Raines decision normally bars suits by individual members of
Congress who simply “allege that a statute has diminished the
institutional authority of the legislative branch, especially where
Congress may simply repeal a disputed statute.”165 Following the Raines

160. Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–26; see also Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 110
(D.D.C. 2018) (interpreting the Coleman and Raines decisions as limiting individual
legislative standing to challenge institutional legislative action to cases like Coleman where
there is complete vote nullification), rev’d sub nom. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50 (D.C.
Cir. 2020); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 66–67 (D.D.C.
2015) (same); Waxman v. Thompson, No. 04-3467, 2006 WL 8432224, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal.
Jul. 24, 2006) (same); Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 149–51 (same).
161. Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 150 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at
823 (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 150 n.50.
162. Id. at 150–51 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 826).
163. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829; Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 150–51
(quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 829).
164. Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 151; Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30.
165. Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 151.
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decision, lower courts have generally rejected suits by individual
legislators that allege that an executive official has improperly
implemented a law.166 As an example, in Russell v. DeJongh,167 the Third
Circuit denied standing to an individual legislator who alleged that the
governor of the Virgin Islands made improper judicial appointments
because the Virgin Islands’ “[l]egislature was free to confirm, reject, or
defer voting on the Governor’s nominees,” and, therefore, there was no
convincing justification in light of the Raines decision to authorize a
legislative member to sue in an Article III federal court when the political
process could provide an effective remedy.168 As is discussed in Part IV,
the district court in Cummings and Judge Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion
in Maloney read the Raines decision as supporting the denial of standing
in suits by legislators who seek information that was withheld by a
federal agency pursuant to § 2954 because a House of Congress could
remedy the violation by issuing a subpoena,169 but the majority decision
in Maloney distinguished the facts in its case from Raines on the grounds
that a federal agency causes a personal injury to members of Congress
when the agency denies information sought under that statute.170
B. Recent Legislative Standing Cases: Arizona State Legislature and
Virginia House of Delegates
1. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission
In 2015, the Supreme Court in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission171 recognized institutional
standing for an entire state legislature, but reaffirmed the continuing
importance of Raines in generally barring standing in cases in which
166. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Raines for the
principle of denying legislative standing for individual members of Congress, in a case
alleging that the President violated the War Powers Act, because members have a
legislative remedy and thus do not need to sue in federal court); Standing over
Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 151–52 n.58; see also Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112,
113–17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invoking Raines’ denial of legislative standing for individual
members of Congress in a case alleging that the President’s executive order for the
protection of rivers exceeded his authority and diminished congressional authority).
167. 491 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2007).
168. Id. at 131–36; Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 151–52 (quoting
Russell, 491 F.3d at 136).
169. See infra Part IV; see also Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 106–10 (D.D.C.
2018), rev’d sub nom. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Maloney, 984 F.3d
at 70 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170. See infra Part IV; Maloney, 984 F.3d at 65–67.
171. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
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individual legislators seek to vindicate institutional interests.172 The
Arizona state legislature had challenged Proposition 106, a statewide
citizen’s initiative that assigned congressional redistricting authority to
an independent commission instead of the legislature, on the grounds
that the proposition violated the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause, 173
which the Arizona state legislature claimed gives state legislatures
“primary responsibility” over congressional redistricting decisions.174 The
Supreme Court held that the Arizona state legislature had standing to
sue because Proposition 106 “strip[ped] the [l]egislature of its alleged
prerogative to initiate redistricting,” and, accordingly, that the
legislature had asserted an adequate injury in fact for Article III
standing.175
The Arizona State Legislature decision distinguished the Raines
decision from the appropriate institutional standing in its case by
pointing out Raines’ narrow holding “that six individual Members of
Congress lacked standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act” and that
“[t]he ‘institutional injury’ at issue, we reasoned, scarcely zeroed in on
any individual Member.”176 Additionally, the Arizona State Legislature
Court observed that there was “some importance to the fact that [the
Raines plaintiffs had] not been authorized to represent their respective
Houses of Congress.”177 Conversely, the Arizona legislature was “an
institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury,” and therefore
quite different from the individual legislators attempting inappropriately
to allege standing in Raines.178
The Arizona State Legislature opinion concluded that the Coleman
decision, which had recognized standing for individual legislators to
challenge an institutional decision, was “[c]loser to the mark” for the facts

172. Id. at 2663–64.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof. . . .”); Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658–59.
174. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658–59, 2661–63; Standing over
Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 158.
175. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663; Standing over Appropriations?, supra
note 1, at 158. On the merits, a divided Court determined that Proposition 106’s creation of
a state redistricting commission did not violate the Constitution’s Elections Clause. Arizona
State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2671–77; Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at
158 n.104.
176. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
821 (1997)); Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 158.
177. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 829);
Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 158–59.
178. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664; Standing over Appropriations?, supra
note 1, at 159.
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in its case than the Raines decision.179 The Raines decision had
interpreted the Coleman decision as standing “for the proposition that
legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a
specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes
into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have
been completely nullified.”180 The Arizona State Legislature decision held
that the Arizona state legislature had Article III standing because
“Proposition 106, together with the Arizona Constitution’s ban on efforts
to undermine the purposes of an initiative, would ‘completely nullif[y]’
any vote by the legislature, now or ‘in the future,’ purporting to adopt a
redistricting plan,” and, accordingly, compared the facts in its case to
those in Coleman. 181 The Arizona State Legislature decision explicitly
evaded the question of whether Congress, a House of Congress, or a
congressional committee has standing to sue the Executive Branch for
circumscribing the authority of Congress: “The case before us does not
touch or concern the question whether Congress has standing to bring a
suit against the President. There is no federal analogue to Arizona’s
initiative power, and a suit between Congress and the President would
raise separation-of-powers concerns absent here.”182
The Arizona State Legislature decision has only limited relevance in
deciding whether the majority opinion in Maloney was correct in
recognizing standing in that case because federal separation-of-powers
principles were absent in a case involving a state legislature. 183 First, the
Arizona State Legislature opinion explicitly circumvented congressional
standing issues and observed that congressional standing raises
separation-of-powers concerns absent in its case involving only a state
legislature.184 Second, the authority of state legislatures to challenge
voter initiatives is a question that does not arise for Congress because
there is no process for federal voter initiatives.185 By interpreting
Coleman as allowing standing for members of Congress only where their
votes are completely nullified,186 the Court’s opinion in Arizona State
Legislature appears to be closer to Judge Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion
179. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665; Standing over Appropriations?, supra
note 1, at 159.
180. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823);
Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 159.
181. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–24);
Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 159.
182. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 n.12; Standing over Appropriations?,
supra note 1, at 159.
183. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 n.12.
184. Id.
185. Id. (“There is no federal analogue to Arizona’s initiative power . . . .”).
186. Id. at 2665; Standing over Appropriations?, supra note 1, at 159.
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in Maloney, or the court opinions in Cummings and Waxman in limiting
the scope of the Coleman opinion to complete nullification cases.187 The
majority opinion in Maloney treated the Arizona State Legislature
decision as an institutional injury case and did not cite the case as
supporting its decision in favor of the congressional plaintiffs.188
2. Virginia House Of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill
In the most recent significant legislative standing case, the Supreme
Court in its 2019 decision in Virginia House of Delegates v. BethuneHill189 held that Virginia’s House of Delegates, the lower house in
Virginia’s bicameral legislature, did not have Article III standing to
represent the State’s interests to appeal a three-judge federal district
court’s redistricting order in a racial gerrymandering case. 190 Virginia’s
Attorney General had declined to appeal the district court’s redistricting
order, but the House of Delegates sought to appeal nevertheless.191 The
Virginia House of Delegates decision concluded that the House of
Delegates did not have standing to sue as the agent of the state because
Virginia law clearly designated Virginia’s Attorney General as having
sole authority to represent the state in civil litigation, including decisions
whether to appeal a case.192
According to the Supreme Court in Virginia House of Delegates, the
fact that the House of Delegates was not the State’s agent for civil
litigation and shared authority over legislative redistricting with the
Virginia Senate distinguished that case from the Arizona State
Legislature decision.193 In the latter case, the “Court recognized the
standing of the Arizona House and Senate—acting together—to challenge
a referendum that gave redistricting authority exclusively to an
independent commission, thereby allegedly usurping the legislature’s
authority under the Federal Constitution over congressional
187. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 72 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 108–10 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d sub nom.
Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Waxman v. Thompson, No. CV 04-3467,
2006 WL 8432224, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006) (discussing cases that describe the
Coleman decision as a narrow exception by which individual members of a legislature may
challenge an institutional decision); see supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Raines’ narrow
interpretation of Coleman).
188. Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62–70 (characterizing the Arizona State Legislature decision
as an institutional injury case and Maloney as involving a personal injury to members of
Congress).
189. 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019).
190. Id. at 1949–56.
191. Id. at 1950.
192. Id. at 1951–53.
193. Id. at 1953–54.
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redistricting.”194 Citing the Raines decision, the majority opinion in
Virginia House of Delegates observed: “[j]ust as individual members lack
standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature, a single
House of a bicameral legislature lacks capacity to assert interests
belonging to the legislature as a whole.” 195 Judge Ginsburg’s dissenting
opinion in Maloney quoted this language from the Virginia House of
Delegates decision to support his view that “individual members lack
standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature,” and,
therefore, that the eight members of the House who sued in Maloney did
not have standing to represent the House as an institution to enforce
§ 2954.196 Additionally, the Virginia House of Delegates decision
determined that the Coleman decision did not help the Virginia House of
Delegates plaintiffs because the Court agreed with the Raines decision
that Coleman represented a narrow exception for legislative standing
where the votes of individual members of a legislature are completely
nullified.197
The Supreme Court’s legislative standing decisions in Coleman,
Raines, Arizona State Legislature, and Virginia House of Delegates were
key precedent for the D.C. Circuit in Maloney.198 On the whole, these four
Supreme Court decisions narrowly defined when individual members of
Congress have standing, but allowed a legislative house or both
legislative houses great authority to have standing to represent the
legislature or an entire state.199 Part IV will address whether the
informational injuries in Maloney are better characterized as personal or
institutional injuries.200 Furthermore, Part IV will examine whether
members of the House or Senate Oversight Committee may have
standing to sue to enforce § 2954, or instead must rely in an entire House
of Congress to enforce a subpoena. 201

194. Id.
195. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997)).
196. See Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 70–71 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Virginia House of Delegates, 139 S. Ct. at 1953–54).
197. Virginia House of Delegates, 139 S. Ct. at 1954.
198. See supra Part III.
199. See supra Part III.
200. See infra Part IV.
201. See infra Part IV.
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IV. THE MALONEY DECISION AND THE DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS IN
CUMMINGS AND WAXMAN
A. Waxman v. Thompson
In a 2006 decision in Waxman v. Thompson,202 Federal District Court
Judge Margaret M. Morrow of the Central District of California held that
individual members of the House Oversight Committee did not suffer a
personal standing injury when their Seven Member Rule information
request pursuant to § 2954 was denied by the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) and its constituent agencies, including the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”).203 Instead, the court
concluded that the government’s denial of information under the statute
was an institutional injury for which individual members of Congress
lacked standing to sue in light of Raines.204 Judge Morrow suggested that
the proper remedy for HHS’ denial of information was for a congressional
committee to issue a subpoena and then for the committee, after
receiving approval for a suit from the entire House of Congress to cite the
agency for contempt, to sue the agency if it refused to respond to the
subpoena.205
Following the Akins and Public Citizen precedent discussed in Part
I, the district court in Waxman concluded that a federal agency’s refusal
to provide information requested pursuant to a federal statutory
mandate generally constitutes a standing injury in fact. 206 However, the
government argued that § 2954 established an institutional right to
information for Congress, and not a personal right of information for
individual members of Congress such as the plaintiffs in the Waxman
case.207 The Waxman decision concluded that the informational injury in
its case was more similar to the institutional standing issues in Raines
than the personal standing issues in Powell because “[a]s in Raines,
however, the right plaintiffs assert flows directly from the fact that they
hold seats in Congress” rather than personal injuries.208 Additionally,
Judge Morrow observed that the plaintiffs had implicitly conceded that
202. No. 04-3467, 2006 WL 8432224 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006).
203. Id. at *1–3, *12.
204. Id. at *12.
205. Id. at *10–12; see Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v.
McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (holding the House of Representatives
has standing to enforce a subpoena not involving the joinder of the Senate); Nash, supra
note 134, at 373–75 (discussing the authority of Congress to subpoena information and to
sue in federal courts to enforce a subpoena).
206. Waxman, 2006 WL 8432224, at *5–6.
207. Id. at *6.
208. Id. at *8.
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they wanted the requested information for institutional legislative
purposes as members of Congress, rather than as individuals, and so
their case was closer to Raines than Powell, stating:
Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s failure to provide information
impaired “their ability to assess whether legislation [was]
needed” or whether a bill that had passed should be “revisit[ed].”
They thus effectively concede that their request was in aid of the
performance of their legislative duties rather than for any private
purpose.209
Furthermore, the Waxman decision read the Coleman decision
narrowly in light of Raines to allow individual members of Congress to
sue regarding institutional injuries only where their votes are completely
nullified and determined that the denial of information in its case did not
meet that standard.210
The Waxman opinion observed that “no federal court appears to have
addressed whether legislators who have a statutory right to information
because they are members of a particular legislative committee have
standing to sue when their request is refused.”211 Judge Morrow then
declared that “[t]he most closely analogous case is Walker v. Cheney.” 212
In Walker, a 2002 decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, the court decided that the Comptroller General of the United
States lacked Article III standing to sue to seek judicial enforcement of
an information request issued to Vice President Cheney for information
regarding the National Energy Policy Development Group (“NEPDG”). 213
The Comptroller General is a Congressional agent who serves as head of
then-entitled General Accounting Office (“GAO”),214 which is an
independent, non-partisan agency now called the Government
Accountability Office that works for Congress.215

209. Id. (footnote omitted).
210. Id. at *7–8.
211. Id. at *9 (footnote omitted).
212. Id. (citing Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.C. 2002)).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/about/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2022). In 2004, the name was changed from the General Accounting Office
to the Government Accountability Office by the GAO Human Capital Reform Act to reflect
that the GAO’s auditors not only perform financial audits, but also conduct a broad range
of performance audits, program evaluations, policy analyses, and legal opinions and
decisions. GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, § 8, 118 Stat. 811,
814 (2004) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 702); Government Accountability Office: What’s in a
Name?, GAOWATCHBLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), https://blog.gao.gov/2014/04/04/government-
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In Walker, the district court determined that the Comptroller
General did not have Article III standing to sue to obtain the information
denied by NEPDG because his injury was “solely institutional” as an
agent of Congress, rather than an actionable personal injury. 216 In his
brief to the Walker court, the Comptroller General had acknowledged
that the purpose of his information request was to serve Congress and
that the statute he invoked as creating a right to the requested
information was designed to serve congressional purposes.217 If the
Comptroller General retired, Judge Morrow reasoned, the now former
Comptroller General would no longer have a claim because he had no
personal interest in the information.218 The Walker decision observed
that a House of Congress or a congressional committee might have
standing to sue to seek the requested information, but that no
congressional subpoena had been issued to obtain the documents. 219 In
Waxman, Judge Morrow analogized the congressional plaintiffs’ request
for information pursuant to § 2954 as similar to the Comptroller
General’s failed request for information in the Walker decision because
both were institutional in nature and in neither case had a House of
Congress issued a subpoena. 220 Accordingly, the Waxman decision denied
Article III standing for the congressional plaintiffs because their request
for information was merely institutional in purpose, and not a real
personal injury, and because the plaintiffs had failed to ask their
congressional committee to issue a subpoena or the House of
Representatives to enforce a subpoena. 221
B. Cummings
In Cummings v. Murphy,222 Judge Mehta generally followed the
Waxman decision in denying Article III standing to eight minority
members of the House Oversight Committee because of historical
precedent that the denial of information to individual members of
Congress is an institutional injury that may only be enforced by Congress
or at least one House of Congress.223 Furthermore, the informational
accountability-office-whats-in-a-name/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CEffective%20July%207%2C
%202004%2C,Reform%20Act%20of%202004%2C%20Pub.
216. Waxman, 2006 WL 8432224, at *9–10.
217. Id. at *9.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *10.
220. Id. at *10–11.
221. Id. at *11–12.
222. 321 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d sub nom. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50
(D.C. Cir. 2020).
223. Id. at 113–18.
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injuries were not personal as to establish a basis for a lawsuit, therefore
the failure of the plaintiffs to obtain approval from the entire House of
Representatives to enforce a subpoena to obtain the requested documents
was fatal to their suit.224 The Cummings decision concluded that the
Seven Member Rule in § 2954 is unenforceable by seven or more members
of Congress, but that potentially an entire House of Congress might sue
to enforce a subpoena, 225 or individual members of Congress may seek
information like any citizen under one of several statutes.226 Judge
Mehta interpreted the Coleman and Raines decisions as limiting
individual legislative standing to challenge institutional legislative
action, especially in cases where there is complete vote nullification like
that which occurred in Coleman.227
The Cummings opinion declared that “the outcome of the case in
large part turn[ed] on application of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Raines . . . .”228 Accordingly, Judge Mehta closely examined the Raines
decision before considering each party’s particular arguments.229 For the
Cummings court, a key aspect of the Raines opinion was the distinction
between the “sufficiently personal” standing injuries in Powell and the
institutional injuries in Raines because the plaintiffs in the latter case
did not allege that they had lost something that they were personally
entitled to, like the congressional seat at issue in Powell.230 Additionally,
the Cummings decision read Raines as limiting Coleman to cases of
complete nullification of a legislator’s vote.231 Furthermore, Judge Mehta
interpreted the Raines decision as concluding that historical practice was
against allowing individual members of Congress to sue the Executive
Branch.232 The Cummings opinion concluded its discussion of the Raines
decision as follows:

224. Id. at 116–17.
225. Id. at 114–17; see Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v.
McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (holding the House of Representatives
has standing to enforce a subpoena not involving the joinder of the Senate); Nash, supra
note 134, at 373–75 (discussing authority of Congress to subpoena information and to sue
in federal courts to enforce a subpoena).
226. “GSA has announced, apparently for the first time in this litigation, that it will
treat Plaintiffs’ requests as if made under the Freedom of Information Act . . . .” Cummings,
321 F. Supp. 3d at 99 (discussing Supreme Court decisions allowing informational standing
for individual citizens or voters).
227. Id. at 110.
228. Id. at 102.
229. Id. at 102–05.
230. Id. at 103 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997)).
231. Id. at 104–05 (citing Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–26).
232. Id. at 105 (citing Raines, 521 U.S. at 826–28).
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To summarize, the following principles emerge from Raines.
Individual Members of Congress generally do not have standing
to vindicate the institutional interests of the house in which they
serve. This means that Members of Congress may go to court to
demand something to which they are privately entitled, but they
cannot claim harm suffered solely in their official capacities as
legislators that “damages all Members of Congress and both
Houses of Congress equally[.]”233
Judge Mehta acknowledged that the informational injuries alleged
by the congressional plaintiffs in this case differed somewhat from the
facts in Raines, so he next addressed how the standing principles in
Raines could be applied to the instant case.234
In Cummings, the congressional plaintiffs argued that their case fell
“outside of Raines, because the informational injury they assert is
sufficient to confer standing under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Spokeo.”235 The plaintiffs maintained that “the denial of information
requested under section 2954 itself constitutes an injury in fact” in light
of the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding informational injuries. 236
Judge Mehta in his Cummings opinion acknowledged that the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Spokeo, Akins, and Public Citizen had
recognized that the government’s denial of information that the public is
authorized to receive pursuant to a statute may constitute a valid Article
III informational injury for suits “brought by private parties,”237 but
concluded that Raines’ distinction between personal and institutional
injuries was more relevant for informational injury claims brought by
government officials such as the congressional plaintiffs. 238 While the
Spokeo decision “recognized that the deprivation of a statutory right to
information can be a sufficiently personal, particularized, and concrete
injury,” the Cummings decision pointed out that “Spokeo also made clear
that the mere denial of a statutory right does not automatically give rise
to a cognizable injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing.”239 The
Spokeo decision quoted Raines for the principle that Article III’s
233. Id. (citations omitted) (first citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); then
quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 821, 829; and then citing Arizona State Legislature v. AIRC,
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015)).
234. Id. at 106–17 (discussing application of Raines to a case involving the denial of
information by the Executive Branch to individual members of Congress).
235. Id. at 106.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 107.
238. Id. at 106–10 (discussing application of Raines to case involving the denial of
information by the Executive Branch to individual members of Congress).
239. Id. at 106–07.
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constitutional standing requirements cannot be waived simply by
Congress “statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would
not otherwise have standing.”240 Accordingly, Judge Mehta determined
“the mere fact that Plaintiffs here have been denied a statutory right to
information conferred by the Seven Member Rule [in § 2954] cannot alone
resolve the standing question.”241
Additionally, the Cummings opinion concluded that the two “other
Supreme Court decisions on which Plaintiffs rely—Akins and Public
Citizen—do not compel a different result.”242 Judge Mehta explained that
“[i]n both cases, the statutes at issue entitled members of the public, not
Members of Congress, to request agency records,” and that Akins and
Public Citizen both involved “private parties, not government officials.” 243
Because Raines’ distinction between personal versus institutional
injuries for plaintiffs who are members of Congress was inapplicable in
Akins and Public Citizen, the Cummings decision concluded that the
standing principles in Raines controlled the case.244
In the Cummings decision, Judge Mehta concluded that the
congressional plaintiffs had alleged an institutional standing injury, not
a personal injury.245 He observed that the parties agreed that Raines
“establishe[d] a binary rubric of potential injuries for purposes of
assessing standing” between either personal or institutional injuries. 246
The sole defendant, the U.S. government, on behalf of the GSA
Administrator, argued that the plaintiffs’ suit for information was
effectively institutional rather than personal because it was based upon
the plaintiffs’ roles as members of the House Oversight Committee and
because the requested information would benefit the House as a whole. 247
Relying on Raines, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs would no
longer have a right to the information if they retired tomorrow from
Congress, and, therefore, that their suit was institutional in nature. 248
The Cummings decision agreed with the defendant’s arguments
against standing under § 2954 and the Waxman decision, the only prior
decision on the standing rights of congressional plaintiffs under § 2954,
to conclude that the plaintiffs had not suffered from a personal injury as

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 107 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 107–10.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
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defined in Raines.249 Rather, the plaintiffs’ informational injury from the
GSA’s denial of their § 2954 request was but an institutional standing
injury because they sued solely in their capacity as members of
Congress.250 In their complaint, the plaintiffs had “tie[d] their injury
directly to their constitutional duties as legislators” on the grounds that
the GSA’s denial of their information request impeded their duties on the
House Oversight Committee and other legislative responsibilities. 251
Judge Mehta determined that the plaintiffs alleged an institutional
standing injury in part because their suit would disappear if they were
to retire from Congress or lose their seat.252
Furthermore, the Cummings decision rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that they had personal injuries in light of either the Powell or
Coleman decisions.253 The Cummings plaintiffs argued that their injury
from being denied information by the GSA was personal even if the
informational right is suffered in their official capacities as legislators
and thus not personal in the sense of being “private.”254 However, Judge
Mehta concluded the plaintiffs’ claims were not personal as defined by
the Raines decision.255 The Raines decision had distinguished between
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.’s personal and “private right” claim to his
congressional seat in Powell, as opposed to the institutional claims in
Raines that were based solely upon the plaintiffs’ status as members of
Congress.256 Judge Mehta concluded that the congressional plaintiffs’
claims were institutional, like in Raines, because their “rights under the
Seven Member Rule derive solely from their membership in the House of
Representatives and, even more specifically, their assignment to the
House Oversight Committee. Again, if a Plaintiff here were to lose her
seat, she likewise would lose all rights under the Seven Member Rule.” 257
The Cummings plaintiffs sought to distinguish Raines on the grounds
that not all members of both Houses of Congress shared their information
injury equally.258 Judge Mehta acknowledged that the Cummings
plaintiffs had suffered from informational injuries that were not the
same as those of all members of Congress, and, therefore, that their

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108–10.
Id. at 108 (quoting Pls.’ Mem. at 27–28).
Id. at 108–09.
Id. at 109 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
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injuries were “more particularized” than those in Raines.259 However, he
pointed out that the Raines Court had read the Powell decision as
requiring a member of Congress to be singled out for unfavorable
treatment different than other members, like Adam Clayton Powell, and
that the Cummings plaintiffs had not suffered from some especially
unfavorable treatment comparable to that of Adam Clayton Powell. 260
Furthermore, the Cummings court determined that the plaintiffs in its
case had not been “‘deprived of something to which they personally are
entitled,’ which would have made the injury ‘more concrete,’” as the
Raines decision had interpreted the Powell decision.261 Additionally,
Raines had limited the Coleman decision to cases in which a member of
Congress asserts complete vote nullification, which was clearly not at
issue in the Cummings decision.262
The Cummings decision agreed with the Walker decision denying
standing to the U.S. Comptroller General, who is an agent of Congress. 263
Like the Comptroller General in Walker, the Cummings congressional
plaintiffs had suffered from an institutional injury when they were
denied information by a federal agency, rather than a personal injury,
because they sought the information for their oversight duties rather
than for some personal interest.264 Accordingly, the Cummings court
decided that the plaintiffs in the case had failed to prove an Article III
standing injury because they “only allege[d] harm stemming from their
official status as legislators, as opposed to injury suffered in their private
capacities.”265
Next, the Cummings decision examined whether the congressional
plaintiffs could assert an institutional injury sufficient for Article III
standing.266 In contrast to Judge Morrow in the Waxman decision and
Judge Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Maloney, which had both limited
Coleman to cases of complete nullification of a legislator’s vote, 267 Judge
Mehta was open to the possibility that individual legislators might be
able to sue for institutional injuries beyond just complete vote
nullification.268 He observed, “Raines arguably left open the question
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997)).
262. Id. at 110 (citing Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–24).
263. Id.
264. Id. (citations omitted).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Waxman v. Thompson, No. CV 04–3467, 2006 WL 8432224, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. July
24, 2006); Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 72 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
268. Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 111–12.
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whether individual Members of Congress have standing to assert other
types of institutional injuries outside the vote dilution context.”269
The Cummings opinion then addressed whether a federal agency’s
denial of information to members of Congress who had requested it
pursuant to § 2954 might be sufficient for standing.270 Judge Mehta
concluded that, “[t]he denial of a Seven Member Rule request, although
not a personal injury, is a more particularized type of institutional injury
than a general diminution of legislative power, such as the dilution of the
efficacy of Congress members’ votes,” which was discussed in the Raines
decision and affects every member of Congress equally.271 The denial of
Seven Member Rule requests affects only some members rather than all
of them equally.272 Furthermore, the Cummings court determined that
“the rejection of a Seven Member Rule request is more concrete than, say,
again, a claim of vote dilution,” such as in Raines.273 Finally, Judge
Mehta declared that “the court finds that Plaintiffs have made a stronger
case than the plaintiffs in Raines that they have suffered the type of
institutional injury that could potentially establish Article III
standing.”274 Accordingly, Judge Mehta was more open to congressional
standing in cases involving a federal agency’s denial of a Seven Member
Rule request than Judge Morrow in the Waxman decision or Judge
Ginsburg in his dissenting opinion in Maloney, who both limited
institutional standing by individual members of Congress to cases like
Coleman in which there is complete vote nullification.275
However, Judge Mehta ultimately denied standing in Cummings
based upon (1) a historical practice of courts denying standing in similar
legislative standing cases, (2) the failure of the entire House to authorize
the plaintiffs’ suit in Cummings, and (3) the availability of alternative
remedies such as the entire House enforcing a subpoena to obtain the
requested information.276 First, the Supreme Court in Raines observed
269. Id. at 112.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 113.
275. Compare id. at 111–13, with Waxman v. Thompson, No. CV 04–3467, 2006 WL
8432224, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006), and Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 72 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50
(D.C. Cir. 2020).
276. See Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 113–17; Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S.
House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 767–68 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(holding that the House of Representatives has standing to enforce a subpoena not
involving the joinder of the Senate); Nash, supra note 134, at 373–75 (discussing authority
of Congress to subpoena information and to sue in federal courts to enforce a subpoena).

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

758

WINTER 2022

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:721

that, historically, when there were confrontations between one or both
Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch, “no suit was brought on
the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power.”277 Accordingly,
in light of this statement from the Raines decision, the Cummings court
observed that “Plaintiffs’ suit therefore runs against the strong current
of history.”278 The Waxman decision had rejected standing in a similar
Seven Member Rule case because historically, most suits by Congress to
obtain information have been through suits to enforce a subpoena
supported by a House of Congress, rather than a suit by several members
to enforce § 2954. 279
Second, the Raines opinion put “some importance” on the failure of
the plaintiffs in the case to obtain authorization from their respective
Houses of Congress to bring a lawsuit against the Executive Branch,
although Raines carefully avoided the contentious legal issue of whether
such authorization automatically supports standing. 280 The Cummings
decision noted: “[i]n this case, Plaintiffs did not secure approval from the
full House before bringing suit—indeed, they did not even try to.”281 The
congressional plaintiffs argued that § 2954 itself provided authorization
for its suit, but Judge Mehta in Cummings pointed out that the statute
did not contain a private right of action authorizing members of Congress
to sue, and that Raines had rejected the idea that a general statutory
authorization to sue was sufficient if members of Congress did not obtain
explicit approval from one or both Houses of Congress for their suit. 282
Finally, the Cummings court emphasized that the congressional
plaintiffs had failed to pursue alternative remedies such as having the
House Oversight Committee issue a subpoena, and then persuading the
entire House to support a suit to enforce the subpoena even if getting
broader support in the House of Representatives would have been
difficult.283 Because of the lack of historical examples to support standing
in § 2954 Seven Member Rule suits, the plaintiffs’ failure to obtain
authorization for their suit from the entire House, and the failure of the
plaintiffs to pursue alternative remedies, such as a subpoena, Judge
Mehta in Cummings held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing
to obtain judicial enforcement of their requests for information from the
GSA under 5 U.S.C. § 2954, and, therefore, granted the defendant’s

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997).
Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 113.
Id. at 113–14 (discussing Waxman, 2006 WL 8432224, at *16).
Id. at 114–16 (discussing Raines, 521 U.S. at 819–20, 829).
Id. at 116.
Id. at 116–17 n.9.
Id. at 117.
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motion to dismiss.284 Judge Mehta demonstrated a willingness to closely
examine precedent and look at all sides of the dispute that unfortunately
was not followed by the three-judge appellate panel that reviewed his
decision in Maloney.285
C. Maloney
In Maloney v. Murphy,286 the D.C. Circuit in a divided two to one
decision reversed and remanded Judge Mehta’s Cummings decision, and
held that the congressional plaintiffs had suffered from a sufficient
Article III standing injury to force judicial enforcement of their requests
for information from the GSA pursuant to § 2954.287 Relying on Akins
and Public Citizen, Judge Millett’s majority opinion in Maloney observed
that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that informational
injuries satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.”288 The Maloney decision
then reasoned that “[t]he right to request information under Section 2954
is on all fours, for standing purposes, with the informational right
conferred by those other statutes,” such as FOIA. 289 Next, the court
concluded that the GSA’s withholding of requested information
constituted “a concrete and particularized injury in fact for purposes of
Article III standing.”290 However, the subsequent TransUnion decision
limited Akins and Public Citizen to statutes authorizing disclosure to the
public at large, and § 2954 is not a public disclosure statute because it is
limited to certain members of Congress.291 Accordingly, while Judge
Millett’s reading of Akins and Public Citizen may have been plausible at
the time of her decision, her interpretation appears to be incompatible
with the TransUnion decision’s limitation of informational injuries to
public disclosure statutes that apply to the public at large, rather than a
narrow group of people.292
The Maloney decision addressed the GSA’s argument that the usual
rules for informational standing injuries do not apply when a statute like
§ 2954 provides information rights only to members of Congress.293 The
GSA acknowledged that the congressional plaintiffs could sue as

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 118.
See infra Part IV.C.
984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Id. at 54, 70.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61.
See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2214 (2021); supra Part II.C.
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214.
Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62.
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members of the public under FOIA or similar statutes. 294 Judge Millett
initially asserted that the fundamental standing analysis for
congressional plaintiffs under § 2954 “is no different for standing
purposes than if these same Requesters had filed a FOIA request for the
same information.”295
Nevertheless, the Maloney decision acknowledged that “[i]n addition,
in analyzing the standing of legislators, cases have traditionally asked
whether the asserted injury is ‘institutional’ or ‘personal.’”296 Judge
Millett first observed, “[a]n institutional injury is one that belongs to the
legislative body of which the legislator is a member.”297 Quoting the
Supreme Court case Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,298 she
explicated that “[i]ndividual members lack standing to assert the
institutional interests of a legislature.”299 Millett further explained that
“[s]uch institutional injuries afflict the interests of the legislature as an
entity; they do not have a distinct personal, particularized effect on
individual legislators.” 300 The Maloney opinion provided a lengthy and
broad definition on the crucial issue of what constitutes a personal
standing injury for a legislator:
A personal injury, by contrast, refers to an injury suffered
directly by the individual legislators to a right that they
themselves individually hold. A personal injury to a legislator, for
Article III purposes, is not limited to injuries suffered in a purely
private capacity, wholly divorced from their occupation. Rather,
in the context of legislator lawsuits, an injury is also “personal”
if it harms the legal rights of the individual legislator, as distinct
from injuries to the institution in which they work or to
legislators as a body.301
The Maloney majority then explicitly criticized the GSA and Judge
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion for proposing an overly broad definition of
what constitutes an institutional injury, and implicitly rejected their
attempt to narrow the definition of what constitutes a personal injury for
a legislator.302 Judge Millett concluded: “[t]he GSA’s argument, like the

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019).
Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 62–63.
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Dissenting Opinion, fundamentally confuses those categories by adopting
a sweeping definition of institutional injury that would cut out of Article
III even those individualized and particularized injuries experienced by
a single legislator alone.”303 However, the Maloney decision did not
grapple with the more nuanced discussion of congressional institutional
and personal injuries in Judge Mehta’s district court decision.304
The Maloney court then disagreed with the GSA’s interpretation of
how the Raines decision had defined an “institutional injury.”305 Judge
Millett distinguished the personal informational injuries suffered by the
congressional plaintiffs from the “diffuse” institutional injury asserted by
the Raines plaintiffs.306 She wrote:
The Requesters do not assert an injury to institutional powers or
functions that “damages all Members of Congress and both
Houses of Congress equally.” The injury they claim—the denial
of information to which they as individual legislators are
statutorily entitled—befell them and only them. Section 2954
vested them specifically and particularly with the right to obtain
information. The 34 other members of the Committee who never
sought the information suffered no deprivation when it was
withheld. Neither did the nearly 400 other Members of the House
who were not on the Committee suffer any informational injury.
Nor was the House (or Senate) itself harmed because the
statutory right does not belong to those institutions.307
The Maloney decision compared the individualized and
particularized injury to the congressional plaintiffs as being “the same as
one suffered by a FOIA plaintiff.” 308
Judge Millett in Maloney explained that the congressional plaintiffs’
injuries in her case were similar to the personal injury discussed in the
Powell decision rather than the institutional injury discussed in
Raines.309 She rejected the GSA’s argument that the plaintiffs’ injury was
institutional because it depended upon each holding their congressional
seat.310 The Maloney opinion declared, “[w]hile the legal right to request
information under Section 2954 runs with Committee membership, the
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 63.
See supra Part IV.B.
See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62–63.
Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 64 (citations omitted) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997)).
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
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injury arises from the asking and its rebuff, not from the seat itself.”311
The Court further explicated that a “personal” standing injury does not
have to be a “private” injury.312 Judge Millett wrote:
In other words, for Article III purposes, the requirement that a
legislator suffer a “personal” injury does not mean that the injury
must be private. Instead, the requirement of a personal injury is
a means of rigorously ensuring that the injury asserted is
particularized and individualized to that legislator’s own
interests. That is, the injury must be one that “zeroes in on the
individual,” rather than an injury that “necessarily damages all
Members of Congress and both Houses of Congress equally” or
that runs with the institutional seat.313
She also rejected Judge Ginsburg’s argument in his dissenting
opinion that § 2954 provided only an institutional benefit for the House
or Senate Oversight Committee rather than personal benefits for
members of an oversight committee.314 The Maloney majority opinion
explained why § 2954 actually conferred personal benefits to committee
members.315 Judge Millett stated,
[t]hat overlooks Section 2954’s express conferral of its
informational right on a minority of committee members.
Committee tools like subpoenas, by contrast, require the
majority’s assent to be exercised. So Section 2954’s plain terms
invest the informational right in legislators, not the legislature.
Which makes the deprivation of requested information an injury
personal to the requesting legislators.316
However, both Judges Morrow and Mehta made stronger arguments
in Waxman and Cummings, respectively, that the injuries to members of
congressional oversight committees when they are denied information
are really institutional injuries to their roles as members of Congress
rather than truly personal injuries like the loss of salary in Powell.317
Judge Mehta in Cummings skillfully analyzed Raines and Powell in

311. Id.
312. Id. at 65–66.
313. Id. at 66 (first quoting Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 824 F.3d 1207, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016);
and then quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997)).
314. Id. at 66–67.
315. Id. at 67.
316. Id.
317. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2022]

SEVEN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

WINTER 2022

763

recognizing that the informational injuries to members of the House
Committee on Government Reform were more personal and
particularized than those raised by the congressional plaintiffs over the
enactment of legislation in Raines. 318 Nevertheless, he pointed out that
the plaintiff members of Congress were asserting an institutional injury
as in Raines, rather than a personal injury as in Powell, because the
members’ need for the requested information depended upon their roles
as members of Congress and the House Oversight Committee, and not
upon personal needs such as receiving their congressional salary like in
Powell.319 Furthermore, he showed that the historical practice of
Congress was to resolve informational disputes by having an entire house
of Congress issue a subpoena rather than having members of Congress
file suit in federal court.320
Citing the Raines and Arizona State Legislature decisions, the
Maloney decision acknowledged that “[w]hen called upon to adjudicate
disputes between the Political Branches and their members, we apply the
standing inquiry with special rigor.”321 However, the Maloney majority
opinion too easily concluded that the congressional plaintiffs had met all
standing requirements.322 Judge Millett distinguished the Raines
decision on the grounds that both Houses had actively opposed the suit
in that case, but that “for what it is worth, the House of Representatives
has never opposed the Requesters’ suit, nor has the Senate.” 323
Additionally, she reasoned that requiring members eligible to file § 2954
requests to obtain approval from the entire House or obtain a subpoena
from the Oversight Committee would defeat the statute’s purpose of
protecting minority Member rights.324 Furthermore, the Maloney
decision rejected Judge Ginsburg’s concern in his dissenting opinion
about § 2954 being used to open the “floodgates” of legislative suits by
pointing out that FOIA allowed every member of Congress “to seek
similar information from Executive Branch agencies as was requested
here, with no hint of such untoward results.” 325
The Maloney majority opinion placed more emphasis on protecting
the authority of Congress than the Waxman decision, the Cummings

318. Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 112–13 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d sub nom.
Maloney, 984 F.3d 50.
319. Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 108–13.
320. Id. at 113–17.
321. Maloney, 984 F.3d at 68.
322. Id. at 68–70.
323. Id. at 68.
324. Id. at 68–69.
325. Id. at 69.
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decision or Judge Ginsberg’s dissenting opinion, which focused more on
avoiding disputes between the political branches. Judge Millett wrote:
The separation of powers, it must be remembered, is not a oneway street that runs to the aggrandizement of the Executive
Branch. When the Political Branches duly enact a statute that
confers a right, the impairment of which courts have long
recognized to be an Article III injury, proper adherence to the
limited constitutional role of the federal courts favors judicial
respect for and recognition of that injury.326
While she has a point about the separation-of-powers not being a oneway street that runs to the aggrandizement of the Executive Branch, the
Raines and Arizona State Legislature decisions, according to Judge
Millett herself, appear to caution that courts should avoid recognizing
standing in disputes between the political branches,327 and those cases’
narrow reading of legislative standing arguably applies even if the denial
of standing might diminish the authority of Congress against the
Executive Branch in some cases.328 Furthermore, she appeared to miss
the possible conclusion that it may be appropriate to read § 2954
narrowly because members can seek the same information pursuant to
FOIA without raising the separation-of-powers concerns inherent in a
§ 2954 suit by a group of members that do not have authorization from
the entire House to sue the Executive Branch.329
The Maloney decision concluded as follows:
[W]e hold that the Requesters have asserted an informational
injury that is sufficient for Article III standing. This decision
resolves only the standing question decided by the district court.
To the extent the GSA’s argument or the district court’s
reasoning implicate the existence of a cause of action, the
appropriate exercise of equitable discretion, or the merits of the
Requesters’ claims, those issues remain to be resolved by the
district court in the first instance. The judgment of the district

326. Id. at 70.
327. Id. at 68.
328. See supra Part III.
329. Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62, 69 (recognizing the ability of members of Congress to seek
information via FOIA rather than § 2954); Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 99, 106–07
(same).
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court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.330
D. Judge Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion in Maloney
Judge Ginsburg in his dissenting opinion in Maloney correctly argued
that the majority opinion “strains Supreme Court precedent to uphold
the standing of Plaintiff-Members to assert the interests of the whole
House.”331 Quoting Virginia House of Delegates,332 Judge Ginsburg
explained that the Supreme Court had stated that “individual members
lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature.” 333
Judge Ginsburg contended that the plaintiff members in their complaint
had alleged an institutional interest in their oversight duties as members
of the House Oversight Committee, rather than a personal interest in the
suit.334 Thus, he concluded that the plaintiff members lacked standing to
bring the case because they lacked the necessary personal injury. 335
Judge Ginsburg explained that the Supreme Court had emphasized
that separation-of-powers concerns were especially acute when
legislators sue the Executive Branch and that individual legislators may
not sue on behalf of a House or both Houses without approval from the
entire body or bodies.336 Because the plaintiff members had an
institutional interest in obtaining information about the Trump leases
for the Oversight Committee, rather than for their personal use, they
could not properly assert personal standing even if § 2954 purported to
give them such a right.337 More appropriately, he maintained, the
Committee should issue a subpoena for the information and then obtain
the support of a majority of the House to file a suit to enforce the
subpoena.338 Judge Ginsburg concluded,
[b]ecause the legislative power and the attendant power of
investigation are committed to the House and not to its Members,
a legislator does not suffer a personal injury when the denial of
information he or she requested impedes the oversight and

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Maloney, 984 F.3d at 70 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019).
Maloney, 984 F.3d at 71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71–76.
Id.
Id. at 75–76.
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legislative responsibilities
respectfully dissent.339

of

the

House.

Accordingly,

I

The arguments against legislative standing for plaintiffs raising
Seven Member Rule suits under § 2954 were similar in Judge Ginsburg’s
dissenting opinion in Maloney as in the district court opinions in Waxman
and Cummings.340 However, he tried to make the case more dramatic by
announcing the potentially ruinous consequences of the majority opinion.
Judge Ginsburg contended:
The consequences of allowing a handful of members to enforce in
court demands for Executive Branch documents without regard
to the wishes of the House majority are sure to be ruinous.
Judicial enforcement of requests under § 2954 will allow the
minority party (or even an ideological fringe of the minority
party) to distract and harass Executive agencies and their most
senior officials; as the district court said, it would subject the
Executive to “the caprice of a restless minority of Members.” . . .
[i]n the past this court has warned it would be hesitant to enforce
a document demand made by “a wayward committee acting
contrary to the will of the House.” Today’s ruling does more than
that; it blazes a trail for judicial enforcement of requests made by
an errant group of Members acting contrary to the will of their
committee, the will of their party, and the will of the House.341
One might speculate that Judge Ginsburg’s overly dramatic
concluding language in Maloney was designed to catch the attention of
the Supreme Court so that they would review the decision, although the
case may become moot now that Donald Trump is no longer President.
While the author mostly agrees with Judge Ginsburg’s argument that
historical precedent and the Raines decision’s definition of institutional
injuries counseled against granting the plaintiff members of Congress
standing pursuant to § 2954, Judge Ginsburg’s use of the word “ruinous”
for such suits is histrionic.342 Judge Millet had a point in rejecting his
“floodgates” of litigation argument by observing that at least some of the

339. Id. at 76.
340. See supra Part IV.
341. Maloney, 984 F.3d at 75–76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (first
quoting Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 115 (2018); then quoting United States
v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976); and then citing Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at
n.16).
342. See supra Part IV.D.
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denied requests in the suit were susceptible to FOIA requests.343 The
truth about § 2954 suits lies more in the modulated decisions of Judge
Morrow in Waxman or Judge Mehta in Cummings than with either Judge
Millet or Judge Ginsburg in Maloney.
CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit’s divided decision in Maloney recognizing standing
for minority party members of the House Oversight Committee appears
questionable in light of the Waxman and Cummings decisions, which had
denied standing under similar circumstances.344 Because the Supreme
Court has never addressed whether the Executive Branch’s denial of
information to individual members of Congress is a personal injury, as in
Powell, or an institutional injury, as in Raines, the Maloney decision is
not obviously wrong in classifying such injuries as personal for members
of Congress.345 However, the Waxman and Cummings decisions appear
to be more faithful to the Supreme Court’s leading decision on legislative
standing, Raines, in treating informational injuries to members of
Congress as institutional because their requests for such information
depend on their institutional status as members of Congress and their
service on oversight committees.346 Moreover, Judge Mehta
demonstrated that historically Congress or a House of Congress has
issued subpoenas to obtain information from the Executive Branch
rather than having members of Congress file suit in federal court when
the Executive Branch refused to hand over requested information to a
congressional committee.347 Additionally, the Waxman and Cummings
decisions are more consistent with separation-of-powers principles
suggesting that federal courts apply strict and narrow standing rules in
cases involving disputes between the political branches.348
It is notable that both Judge Morrow and Judge Mehta in their § 2954
decisions denying standing were not affected by their probable political
sympathies. In Waxman, the lead congressional plaintiff, Henry A.
Waxman, was a member of the Democratic Party who had then served in

343. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 69.
344. See supra Part IV.
345. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62–70.
346. See supra Part IV.
347. Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 113–17 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d sub nom.
Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
348. See Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 113–14 (citing Waxman v. Thompson, No. CV
04-3467, 2006 WL 8432224, at *16 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006)).
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Congress for over twenty-five years since 1975349 and was ranking
minority member of the House Committee on Government Reform.350 In
2004, the administration of President George W. Bush, a Republican
president, denied the information to Waxman.351 Judge Morrow was
appointed by Democratic President Bill Clinton,352 but she denied
standing in the Waxman case, and ruled against a leading Democratic
member of Congress, effectively in favor of a Republican President.353
Similarly, Judge Mehta, a Barack Obama appointee, 354 in Cummings
denied standing to Democratic Members of Congress who sought
information against a Republican President whose GSA appeared to be
very unfair in denying requested information because of precedent and
historical practice.355
To promote the policy goal of transparent government operations, it
may appear preferable to have federal courts recognize Article III
standing when at least seven members of the Committee on Government
Operations of the House of Representatives or five members of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs sue a federal agency that refuses to
comply with § 2954’s mandate that federal agencies “submit any
information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction
of the committee.”356 The GSA initially asserted that it did not have a
legal duty, based upon a memorandum from the U.S. Office of Legal
Counsel (“OLC”), to respond to information requests from individual
members of Congress, including ranking minority members, except
“‘when those requests come from a committee, subcommittee, or
chairman authorized to conduct oversight.’”357 However, the White House
soon reversed course in a letter to Republican Senator Charles Grassley,
then serving as Chair of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,358 that
asserted that the OLC memorandum did not state Trump administration
349. Henry Waxman, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Waxman (last
visited Mar. 3, 2022).
350. Waxman, 2006 WL 8432224, at *2.
351. Id. at *1–2; Frank Friedel & Hugh Sidey, President George W. Bush, THE WHITE
HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/george-w-bush/
(last visited Mar. 3, 2022) (detailing President Bush’s time in office from 2001 until 2009).
352. Morrow, Margaret M., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/morrowmargaret-m (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
353. Waxman, 2006 WL 8432224, at *16.
354. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
355. See infra Parts IV.B, Conclusion; Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 97–98
(D.D.C. 2018), rev’d sub nom. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
356. 29 U.S.C. § 2954; see Maloney, 984 F.3d at 54–57 (discussing § 2954).
357. Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 99 (quoting letter from P. Brennan Hart, III, Assoc.
Adm’r, Gen. Servs. Admin. (July 17, 2017)).
358. About Grassley, OFF. GOV’T WEBSITE FOR SENATOR CHUCK GRASSLEY,
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/service (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
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policy, but rather that it was the administration’s “‘policy . . . to respect
the rights of all individual Members, regardless of party affiliation, to
request information about Executive branch policies and programs.’”359
Yet, the GSA failed to produce any of the records requested by the
plaintiffs in the Cummings (subsequently Maloney) litigation.360 From
the standpoint of courtesy or policy, it is hard to defend the GSA’s denial
of information to the congressional plaintiffs in that case.
There are good policy arguments that the Trump administration
should have produced the information requested by the congressional
plaintiffs in the Cummings/Maloney lawsuit, and the Trump White
House itself acknowledged that it should have done so. 361 Nevertheless,
there are fundamental separation-of-powers concerns about federal
courts intervening in disputes brought by legislators against the
Executive Branch or disputes between the political branches in general,
and, as a result, courts properly take a narrow view of Article III standing
in such cases.362 Accordingly, the Cummings decision, the Waxman
decision, and Judge Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Maloney made
strong arguments that individual members of Congress, or a petition by
seven House Members or five Senators pursuant to § 2954, lack Article
III standing to challenge a federal agency’s denial of requested
information in light of separation-of-powers concerns about the
impropriety of federal courts intervening in disputes between the
political branches. However, a House of Congress could sue to enforce a

359. Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 99 (quoting Pls.’ Compl. at ¶ 29).
360. Id.; see generally Maloney, 984 F.3d at 50–76.
361. See Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 99 (quoting Pls.’ Compl. at ¶ 29).
362. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–21 (observing that courts apply strict standing
rules in suits involving a dispute between the political branches); Maloney, 984 F.3d at 58–
59, 68 (same); Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 101–02 (same); see Comm. on the Judiciary of
the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 763, 769–72 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(en banc) (addressing standing issue with “rigor” in a case involving a conflict between
Congress, a former Executive Branch official, and the Executive).
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subpoena for such information,363 or an individual member of Congress
could bring a FOIA request.364
The Maloney majority opinion is cleverly argued, but it lacks the
nuance and attention to historical practice in separation-of-powers cases
found in Judge Mehta’s Cummings decision, which Maloney
unfortunately reversed.365 The Maloney decision was well intentioned in
seeking to correct an unfair decision by the GSA to deny requested
information to the congressional plaintiffs, but the majority
inappropriately treated an institutional standing issue as a personal
standing injury.366 The flawed approach to congressional standing in
Maloney could trigger a flood of suits by small numbers of congressional
members that could lead to excessive judicial involvement in political
disputes between the Executive Branch and aggrieved individual
members of Congress.367 The district court decisions in Cummings and
Waxman adopted a better approach to separation-of-powers disputes
between Congress and the Executive Branch by following the
institutional standing injury limitations in the Supreme Court’s leading
decision in Raines.368
Judge Millett’s majority opinion in Maloney relied heavily on Akins
and Public Citizen in determining that the congressional plaintiffs’
informational injuries under § 2954 satisfied Article III’s injury-in-fact
requirement.369 The Maloney decision treated their § 2954 information
injuries as concrete and particularized injuries similar with the
informational right conferred by those other statutes such as FOIA. 370
Even if her reasoning was plausible at that time, the subsequent
TransUnion decision limited Akins and Public Citizen to statutes
authorizing disclosure to the public at large, and § 2954 is not a public
363. See Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62 (GSA acknowledged the right of individual members of
Congress to obtain information under FOIA); id. at 75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing
subpoena authority of a House of Congress); Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 99, 114–17
(quoting letter from P. Brennan Hart, III, Assoc. Adm’r, Gen. Servs. Admin. (July 17,
2017)); Waxman v. Thompson, No. 04-3467, 2006 WL 8432224, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. July
24, 2006); McGahn, 968 F.3d at 767, 778 (holding the House of Representatives has
standing to enforce a subpoena not involving the joinder of the Senate); Nash, supra note
134, at 373–75 (discussing authority of Congress to subpoena information and to sue in
federal courts to enforce a subpoena).
364. Maloney, 984 F.3d at 62 (GSA acknowledged right of individual Members of
Congress to obtain information under FOIA); Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 99, 106–07
(discussing the right of individual members of the public to information under FOIA).
365. See supra Part IV.B–C.
366. See supra Part IV.C.
367. See supra Part IV.C.
368. See supra Part IV.B–C.
369. See supra Part IV.C.
370. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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disclosure statute because it is limited to certain members of Congress. 371
Thus, Judge Millett’s interpretation of Akins and Public Citizen is
arguably inconsistent with TransUnion and, therefore, the Maloney
decision should have only limited precedential value in the future.372

371.
372.

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.

